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THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND MEASURING MEDIA DIVERSITY: 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND REGULATORY 
CHALLENGES 
Adam Candeub* 
Since the New Deal, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has 
placed limits on the number of media outlets one entity can control in either 
national and local media markets. I The FCC also has promulgated "cross-
ownership" restrictions prohibiting, for instance, oQe entity from owning a 
television and newspaper station in a particular local market.2 The FCC has 
justified its regulations, in significant part, as efforts to promote diversity of 
viewpoint.3 While the Supreme Court for decades has upheld these restrictions 
against First Amendment challenge, the Court's most recent cases, as well as 
those from lower courts, suggest growing disagreement over the degree to which 
these restrictions are exempt from First Amendment scrutiny.4 
This article will examine the courts' growing unease with media ownership 
regulation and whether this judicial shift represents what our symposium calls 
"First Amendment Lochnerism." As the other symposium participants have 
observed, "Lochnerism" has become an epithet with no precise reference, other 
than being something most judges seemingly wish to avoid at all costs. As 
symposium participants also point out, however, "Lochnerism," in a general and 
imprecise way, refers to the judicial use of constitutional principles to strike 
down or limit reasonable economic regulation in order to impose some type of 
unpalatable, laissez-faire economic ideology.5 "First Amendment Lochnerism," 
our symposium's topic, would therefore refer to using the First Amendment, as 
opposed to substantive due process, to limit government's power to impose 
economic regulation to further ideological goals.6 
The Article concludes that such an ideological shift might well exist or may 
be occurring in the future-at least as exemplified by in Turner Broadcasting v. 
FCC (Turner 1).7 There, the Court applied First Amendment intermediate 
scrutiny to cable regUlation, marking a departure from previous more deferential 
* Adam Candeub is an Assistant Professor of Law at Michigan State University College of Law 
in East Lansing, Michigan. 
1. THOMAS G. KRATIENMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE, JR., REGULATING BROADCAST 
PROGRAMMING 89 (The MIT Press & The AEI Press 1994). 
2. See id. at 94-95. 
3. [d. at 89. 
4. [d. at 175. 
5. See id. at 184. 
6. KRATIENMAKER & POWE, JR., supra note 1, at 188. 
7. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994). 
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scrutiny of media regulation.8 In addition, the four justice-dissent went further, 
arguing for strict scrutiny.9 Viewing this case as shift towards "Lochnerism" is 
nothing new. Numerous eminent commentators already have concluded 
explicitly that Lochner-type review is being applied to the media and information 
industry regulation. 10 
This article, however, argues that the problems the FCC's regulations have 
faced are more complex than a media regulation-allergic Supreme Court. The 
problems stem from the FCC's inability or unwillingness to rely on meaningful 
metrics for media diversity-and reflect, therefore, a regulatory failing as much 
as a doctrinal shift in the judiciary. II After all, courts, consisting both of 
majority Democratic- and Republican-appointed judges, have come down on the 
intellectual vacuity of the FCC's decision-making-particularly its inability to 
describe and measure the object of its regulation: a robust, diverse media 
market. For instance, the Third Circuit in a panel consisting of Thomas L. 
Ambro and Julio Fuentes, both Clinton appointees, in Prometheus Radio struck 
down the FCC's order deregulating media and did so on grounds that more 
conservative appellate judges have relied upon: the inconsistency of the FCC's 
treatment of diversity.12 In other words, courts on both sides of the ideological 
spectrum have struck down FCC regulation and deregulation relying on similar 
grounds-the FCC's weak definition and quantification of diversity. 13 
8. [d. at 661-62. See C. Edwin Baker, Media Structure, Ownership Policy, And The First 
Amendment, 78 S. CAL. L. REv. 733, 758 (2005) (stating: "Before Turner Broadcasting System, 
Inc. v. FCC ('Turner I') the 'reasonableness' standard articulated in FCC v. National Citizens 
Committee for Broadcasting ('NCCB') arguably represented the courts' treatment of structural 
regulation in all communications media, not just in the case's 'official' domain of broadcasting."). 
9. See Turner, 512 U.S. at 674-86 (Scalia, J. and Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
10. Jim Chen, Conduit-Based Regulation of Speech, 54 DUKE L.J. 1359, 1456 (2005) (''The 
shield protecting ordinary economic regulation from First Amendment scrutiny has worn thin. The 
doctrinal distinction may not withstand the sheer amount of money in contemporary 
communications."); Michael Burstein, Towards A New Standard For First Amendment Review Of 
Structural Media Regulati9 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1030 (2004) (arguing that "such Lochner-like scrutiny 
is inappropriate in media regulation cases"); Glen O. Robinson, The Electronic First Amendment: 
An Essay for the New Age, 47 DUKE L.J. 899,944-45 (1998) ("the First Amendment has become 
the first line of challenge for virtually all forms of regulatory initiatives."); Jack M. Balkin, Digital 
Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 
79 N.Y.U. L. REv. I, 27-28 (2004) ("We are living through a Second Gilded Age, which ... comes 
complete with its own reconstruction of the meaning of liberty and property. Freedom of speech is 
becoming a generalized right against economic regulation of the information industries. "); Benkler, 
supra note 9, at 201-03 ("As the information economy and society have moved to center stage, the 
First Amendment is increasingly used to impose judicial review on all regulation of this sphere of 
social and economic life. "); Yochai Benkler, Through the Looking Glass: Alice and the 
Constitutional Foundations of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 201-05 
(2003). 
11. See Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 450 (3d Cir. 2004) 
12. Compare Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 423-25 (3d. Cir. 2004) with 
Sinclair Broadcast Group v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148 (DC Cir. 2002). 
13. Compare id. at 423-25 with Sinclair Broad. Group v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 152-56 (D.C. 
Cir.2oo2). 
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Diversity is a central goal of FCC regulation. The Supreme Court repeatedly 
has stated that the FCC may limit ownership in order to further "viewpoint 
diversity," the number of viewpoints and ideas expressed in media coverage and 
political debate. The FCC, however, does not attempt to quantify or identify the 
number of viewpoints and ideas in a given media marketI4 Instead, it simply 
equates viewpoint diversity to diversity of ownership almost as a matter of 
religious faith-without empirical backing. I5 The Biennial Media Ownership 
Order,I6 the FCC's recent and comprehensive statement of its regulatory 
principle states with shocking, and probably unintended, bluntness, "[a] larger 
number of independent owners will tend to generate a wider array of viewpoints 
in the media than would a comparatively smaller number of owners. We believe 
this proposition, even without the benefit of conclusive empirical evidence ... 
,,17 
Accepting the connection between diversity of ownership and viewpoint as a 
self-evident truth is tendentious, particularly because a significant body of 
economic theory suggests the opposite: that concentrated ownership produces 
greater diversity in programming content. IS Judge Posner explained this insight 
in Schurz v. FCC, discussed infra: 
It has long been understood that monopoly in broadcasting could actually 
promote rather than retard programming diversity. If all the television channels 
in a particular market were owned by a single firm, its optimal programming 
strategy would be to put on a sufficiently varied menu of programs in each time 
slot to appeal to every substantial group of potential television viewers in the 
market, not just the largest group. For that would be the strategy that 
maximized the size of the station's audience. Suppose, as a simple example, 
that there were only two television broadcast frequencies (and no cable 
television), and that 90 percent of the viewers in the market wanted to watch 
comedy from 7 to 8 p.m. and 10 percent wanted to watch ballet. The 
monopolist would broadcast comedy over one frequency and ballet over the 
other, and thus gain 100 percent of the potential audience. If the frequencies 
were licensed to two competing firms, each firm would broadcast comedy in 
the 7 to· 8 p.m. time slot, because its expected audience share would be 45 
percent (one half of 90 percent), which is greater than 10 percent. Each prime-
time slot would be filled with "popular" programming targeted on the median 
viewer, and minority tastes would go unserved. Some critics of television 
believe that this is a fair description of prime-time network television. Each 
14. See FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 796 (1978). 
15. See id. at 780. 
16. 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review - Review Of The Commission's Broadcast Ownership 
Rules And Other Rules Adopted Pursuant To Section 202 Of The Telecommunications Act Of 
1996, 18 F.C.C.R. 13620 (2003) (Biennial Media Ownership Order). 
17. Biennial Media Ownership Order, supra note 14, at 13630. 
18. A recent analysis suggesting a connection between increased media concentration and 
increased viewpoint diversity can be found in Simon P. Anderson & Stephen Coate, Market 
Provision of Broadcasting: A Welfare Analysis, 72 Review of Economic Studies 947 (2005). This 
insight is quite old, being first applied to broadcast in Peter Steiner, Program Patterns and 
Preferences, and the Workability of Competition in Radio Broadcasting, 66 Q. J. of Econ. 194 
(1952). 
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network vies to put on the most popular programs and as Ii result minority 
tastes are ill served.19 
As with most economic insights, its application is questionable, depending 
on numerous assumptions that mayor may not be appropriate in today's media 
m.arkets. 20 Yet, even if one were to dismiss this insight as so much theoretical 
musing and agree with the D.C. Circuit and the FCC that "ownership is perhaps 
an aspirational but surely not an irrational proxy" for diversity in prograrnming,21 
this proxy has proven intractable. The FCC has difficulty determining when 
there are "enough" independently owned media outlets in a given market. 
Indeed, this inquiry is meaningless when not tethered to a measurement of 
whether or not more independently owned outlets produce more diversity of 
media content. Conceptually hobbled, the FCC produces Humpty-Dumpty from 
Alice in Wonderland-type regulation in which claims about diversity exist 
without any general standard of empirical justification, i.e., enough diversity is 
what the FCC says is enough. It also results in the stunning recent record of 
failure of the FCC's media ownership rules when reviewed by the courts of 
appeal. 22 
This article proposes two approaches, empirical and normative, to strengthen 
the regulatory justification for media ownership regulation in times of ever more 
demanding judicial scrutiny. On the empirical side, the FCC; following the lead 
of numerous economics and communications scholars, could make a serious 
effort to measure media diversity and tackle the difficult question of enumerating 
the number of ideas and concepts expressed within a given media market 
structure?3 To date, it has not done so, but has used economic and empirical 
data in a haphazard, even chaotic manner?4 Second, it could argue from 
19. Schurz Communications, Inc. v. F.C.C., 982 F.2d 1043, 1054 (7th Cir. 1992). 
20. See id. (stating: "We therefore continue to believe that broadcast ownership limits are 
necessary to preserve and promote viewpoint diversity .... We believe this proposition, even 
without the benefit of conclusive empirical evidence remains sound."). 
21. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. F.C.C., 280 F.3d 1027, 1047 (2002). 
22. It is hard to remember a major FCC media ownership rule that has been· upheld. See 
Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 403 (3d. Cir. 2004) (remanding the FCC's 
"Cross-Media Limits" for justification or further modification); Fox Television v. FCC, 280 F.3d 
1027, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (remanding the FCC's decision concerning the national television 
station ownership cap and cable cross-ownership rule); Sinclair Broad. Group v. FCC, 284 F.3d 
148, 169 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding the FCC failed to justify adequately its local ownership rules 
even under a deferential standard of review); Time Warner Entm't Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 
1136 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding the horizontal ownership cap for cable arbitrary and capricious). 
23. See generally Brian C. Hill, Measuring Media Market Diversity: Concentration, 
Importance, and Pluralism, 58 FED. COMM. L.J. 169, 188-89 (2006) (discussing and critiquing the 
use of various indices that measure media diversity); David S. Miller, Limits on Media Ownership; 
Should the FCC Curb Its Reliance on Deregulation?, U. ILL. J.L. TEcH. & POL'y 345, 353 (2004) 
(discussing the FCC's use of its own "Diversity Index" ("01") and outside criticisms of its use). 
24. See Miller, supra. note 18, at 353 (stating that the FCC's use of its own "Diversity Index" 
to gauge the degree of media diversity concentration "is the source of widespread opposition to the 
methods used by the FCC to determine the limits of market saturation."). 
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nonnative grounds the importance of decentralized ownership and maximize it 
up to the point at which economic data clearly point to inefficiencies.2s In this 
way, firm normative principles would guide regulatory action, and those 
opposing such action would have to build their case on the shifting sands of 
economic data and analysis.26 Such a move, the Article argues, would result in a 
de facto shift of the burden of persuasion from the FCC to pro-deregulation 
parties?7 
This article will proceed as follows. First, it will examine the First 
Amendment challenges to media ownership regulation; most particularly, recent 
cases, such as Turner Broadcastini8 and Time Warner,29 that create a higher 
degree of judicial scrutiny of ownership regulation.3D Second, the Article turns 
to the FCC's Biennial Media Ownership Order and its judicial review. This 
comprehensive order concisely exemplifies31 the FCC's use of the First 
Amendment to limit its scrutiny of the relationship between viewpoint diversity 
and market structure and deflect attention from the shallowness of its economic 
and empirical analyses.32 Finally, this article describes its two approaches to 
more firmly justify media ownership regulation in the face of more hostile 
judicial review. 
I. MEDIA OWNERSHIP AND CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS 
The Federal Communications Commission has been in the business of 
restricting media ownership almost since the agency's inception?3 Since the 
25. See generally Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, the 
Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase's "Big Joke": An Essay on 
Airwave Allocation Policy, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 335, 533 (2001) (stating "[t]he nonnative goal 
of spectrum refonn should be to enable market allocation of radio spectrum. FCC planning would 
yield to private, decentralized decisions detennining radio wave use."). 
26. See id. at 534-35 (discussing opposition to FCC refonn). 
27. See id. at 535. 
28. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner 1),512 U.S. 622 (1994). 
29. Time Warner Entm't Co., LP. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2(01). 
30. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 at 641 (applying "some measure of 
heightened First Amendment scrutiny .... "); Time Warner Entm't Co., L.P. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 
1126 at 1130 (applying "intennediate scrutiny."). 
31. It is difficult to refer to a 400 page order as concise, but for the FCC to put a 
comprehensive statement of its ownership rul~s in one document is an achievement of sorts. 
32. 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review - Review of the Commission's Broadcast Ownership 
Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
Cross-Ownership of Broadcast Stations and Newspapers, Rules and Policies Concerning Multiple 
Ownership of Radio Broadcast Stations in Local Markets, Definition of Radio Markets, Definition 
of Radio Markets for Areas Not Located in an Arbitron Survey Area, 18 F.C.C.R. 1,4Jl 13 at 13625-
26 (2003) [Hereinafter Biennial Media Ownership Order]. 
33. See generally Enrique Armijo, Public Airwaves, Private Mergers: Analyzing the FCC's 
Faulty Justifications for the 2003 Media Ownership Rule Changes, 82 N.C. L. REv. 1482, 1486 
n.21 (2004); Loy A Singleton & Steven C. Rockwell, Silent Voices: Analyzing the FCC "Media 
Voices" Criteria Limiting Local Radio-Television Cross-Ownership, 8 COMM. L. & POL'y 385, 387 
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1930s, the FCC has considered furthering diversity in ownership as a goal in 
awarding radio licenses and later applied the principle to broadcast licenses.34 
As discussed in Section ill, many have interpreted these efforts as merely veils to 
conceal presidential pique at certain groups critical of administration policies. Be 
that as it may, a remarkably complex qUilt of rules has developed over the 
decades that limit ownership in broadcast, radio, cable, and, to some degree, 
newspaper ownership.35 Due to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals' rebuff in 
Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC6 of the FCC's recent effort to ease these 
rules, they continue in large measure to be in force. 37 
These rules have been challenged on First Amendment grounds since these 
rules' inception.38 The challenge to these rules is straightforward: they limit the 
number of outlets individuals or corporations may own so as to express and/or 
set forth their views-and, therefore, constitute federal restrictions on the 
press.39 The Supreme Court traditionally has reviewed the FCC restrictions, 
however, under the highly deferential rational basis standard-treating them 
essentially as economic regulation, not free speech regulation.40 On the other 
hand, recent decisions, such as Turner Broadcasting v. FCC /1 and 1/2; as well 
as certain lower court rulings, such as Schurz Communications, Inc. v. FCC,43 
Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc. v. FCC,44 and Time Warner Entertainment Co., 
L.P. v. FCe5 suggest a retreat from previous, almost axiomatic deference.46 
(2003) (stating "[a]t its inception, the Communications Act of 1934 provided the [FCC] with 
authority to regulate concentrations of [media] ownership in the public interest."). 
34. See LUCAS A. POWE JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 167 
(1987). 
35. See generally Leonard M. Baynes, Race, Media Consolidation, and Online Content: The 
Lack of Substitutes Available to Media Consumers of Color, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 199, 199-
200 (2006) (discussing the FCC's attempt to limit the number of media outlets anyone owner 
could own). 
36. 373 F.3d 372, 423-25 (3d. Cir. 2004). 
37. See Baynes, supra note 30, at 200-02 (discussing the effect of the Prometheus Radio 
Project case). 
38. See, e.g., FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 799-800 (1978) 
(stating a typical argument that "it is inconsistent with the First Amendment to promote 
diversification by barring a newspaper owner from owning certain broadcast stations."). 
39. See id. 
40. See, e.g., FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 796 (1978) (stating 
"[i]t is thus clear that the [FCC] regulations at issue are based on permissible public-interest goals 
and, so long as the regulations are not an unreasonable means for seeking to achieve these goals, 
they fall within the [FCC's] general rulemaking authority .... "). 
41. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner 1),512 U.S. 622 (1994). 
42. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner 11),520 U.S. 180 (1997). 
43. 982 F.2d 1043 (7th Cir. 1992). 
44. 284 F.3d 148 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
45. 240 F.3d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
46. See Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 639 (1994) (holding that "application of the more relaxed 
standard of scrutiny adopted in Red Lion and the other broadcast cases is inapt when determining 
the First Amendment validity of cable regulation."); Turner II, 520 U.S. 180, 189-90 (1997) 
(applying the O'Brien intermediate test); Schurz Comm 'n, Inc., 982 F.2d 1043, 1049-50 (7th Cir. 
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The following briefly describes the Supreme Court's treatment of media 
ownership regulation. It discusses the changes in this treatment that have 
occurred-<:hanges towards higher levels of scrutiny. This analysis will focus 
on how courts' changed views of diversity have led to more rigorous scrutiny. 
A. Judicial Deference to the FCC's Notions of Diversity 
Without providing an exhaustive examination of the judicial precedent 
concerning the FCC's media ownership rules, ajob that others have already done 
extremely well, the following briefly surveys the major historic features of 
judicial deference towards the FCC's media ownership regulation, concentrating 
on the concept of diversity-how the FCC uses it and courts understand it. 
The first challenge of the Federal Communication Commission's ownership 
regulation was in 1943, in Nat'l Broadcasting Co. v. United States, which 
involved to the broadcast industry's First Amendment challenge to the FCC's 
"Chain Broadcasting Regulations." These rules prohibited the granting of 
"licenses . . . to stations or applicants having specified relationships with 
networks.,,47 
Some of the Chain Broadcasting Regulations were behavioral, setting forth 
mandates on networks and broadcasters; others were structural, regulating 
ownership interests and industry organizations. On the behavioral side, the 
Regulations prohibited contracts between broadcasters and networks that 
restricted the broadcaster's ability to use non-affiliated network programming, 
agreements that forbade networks to sell programs to any other station in the 
same area, affiliation agreements that extended more than three years, network 
affiliation contracts that gave networks the power to specify what programs 
would be aired during certain time slots, and networks' failure to describe their 
programming sufficiently in advance so that the broadcaster could decide 
whether to air it.48 Finally, the Regulations prohibited a broadcast station from 
"having any contract, arrangement, or understanding, express or implied, with a 
network organization under which the station is prevented or hindered from, or 
penalized for, fixing or altering its rates for the sale of broadcast time for other 
than the network's programs. ,,49 
On the structural side, the Regulations forbade the licensing of two stations 
in the same area to a single network as "basically unsound and contrary to the 
public interest."so In addition, the rules prohibited any license to be granted to a 
1992) (applying a rational basis test but finding that the FCC did not meet rational basis standards); 
Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc., 284 F.3d 148, 167-68 (applying rational basis review) (D.C. Cir. 
2002); Time Warner Entm't Co., 240 F.3d 1126, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 2(01) (relying on Turner II and 
applying the O'Brien intermediate test). 
47. Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 196 (1943). 
48. See id. at 199-201. 
49. [d. at 209. 
50. [d. at 207. 
HeinOnline -- 33 N. Ky. L. Rev. 380 2006
· NORTHERN KENTUCKY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:4 
network organization, or any entity controlled by a network, if such license 
involved more than one standard broadcast station where one of the stations 
covered substantially the service area of the other station.51 . 
Against First Amendment challenged, the Court upheld these regulations, 
relying on what became the "scarcity" doctrine - which holds that given the 
limited amount of broadcast spectrum, the federal government has the power to 
regulate broadcast in spite of the First Amendment. 
Freedom of utterance is abridged to many who wish to use the limited 
facilities of radio. Unlike other modes of expression, radio inherently is 
not available to all. That is its unique characteristic, and that is why, 
unlike other modes of expression, it is subject to governmental 
regulation .... The right of free speech does not include, however, the 
right to use the facilities of radio without a license. . . . Denial of a 
station license on that ground, if valid under the Act, is not a denial of 
52 free speech. 
The next review of an FCC ownership restriction, United States v. Storer 
Broad. CO.,53 involved the FCC's Multiple Ownership Rules, which restricted 
the number of licenses for PM radio stations that could be granted if the 
applicant, directly or indirectly, had an interest in AM radio stations. 
Individuals, such as the respondents, who already owned a number of AM or 
"standard stations," could own fewer than they wished to. In a statutory 
challenge the Court upheld these regulations with little constitutional analysis.54 
The Supreme Court's next major re-examination of the FCC's media 
ownership policy occurred several decades later in Federal Communications 
Commission v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting.55 The Court 
reviewed FCC rules that prohibited cross-ownership between broadcast and 
newspapers, i.e., forbade entities that owned either radio or television stations 
from owning a newspaper in the same community.56 Here, the FCC justified its 
rules explicitly on be diversity" concept.57 As the Supreme Court stated, 
"[diversification] of control of the media of mass communications' has been 
viewed by the Commission as 'a factor of primary significance' in determining 
51. [d. at 208. 
52. [d. at 226-27. 
53. 351 U.S. 192 (1956). 
54. [d. at 203. "The Communications Act must be read as a whole and with appreciation of 
the responsibilities of the body charged with its fair and efficient operation. The growing 
complexity of our economy induced the Congress to place regulation of businesses like 
communication in specialized agencies with broad powers. Courts are slow to interfere with their 
conclusions when reconcilable with statutory directions." [d. 
55. 436 U.S. 775 (1978). 
56. [d. at 779. 
57. [d. at 794. 
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who, among competing applicants in a comparative proceeding, should receive 
the initial license for a particular broadcast facility.,,58 
The Court accepted wholeheartedly the FCC's diversity justification-
arguing (somewhat paradoxically) that by limiting the rights of entities to own 
media outlets one was, in fact, furthering First Amendment goals.59 Relying on 
language from Associated Press v. United States, an antitrust case dealing with 
the exclusive practices of the Associated Press in selling stories to non-affiliated 
newspapers, the Court stated that "Our past decisions have recognized, 
moreover, that the First Amendment and. antitrust values underlying the 
Commission's diversification policy may properly be considered by the 
Commission in determining where the public interest lies. [T]he 'public interest' 
standard necessarily invites reference to . . . the First Amendment goal of 
achieving "the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and 
antagonistic sources.,,60 
In explicitly stating the rather paradoxical notion that restricting ownership 
of news outlets furthers the First Amendment goals of diversity, the Court 
showed a remarkable deference to the FCC in defining and measuring 
diversity.61 The Court stated that the First Amendment seeks diversity of 
"viewpoint.,,62 The Court sometimes appears to equate diversity of viewpoint 
with diversity of ownership.63 At other times, it simply accepts the 
Commission's judgment that diversity of ownership is an acceptable proxy for 
diversity of viewpoint.64 The Court stated "notwithstanding the inconclusiveness 
of the rulemaking record, the Commission acted rationally in finding that 
diversification of ownership would enhance the possibility of achieving greater 
diversity of viewpoints .... [d]iversity and its effects are ... elusive concepts, 
not easily defined let alone measured without making qualitative judgments 
objectionable on both policy and First Amendment grounds .... ,,65 
NCCB represents the high tide mark in judicial deference to the FCC's 
power to regulate media market structures and .its determinations concerning 
58. [d. at 781 (citing Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 
394-395 (1965». 
59. National Citizens Committee/or Broadcasting, 436 U.S. at 795. 
60. [d. (citing Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 122 
(1973) and Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1,20 (1945». 
61. [d. at 796. 
62. [d. at 796-97. 
63. [d. 
64. Compare id. at 797 ("It had thus become both feasible and more urgent for the 
Commission to take steps to increase diversification of ownership, and a change in the 
Commission's policy toward new licensing offered the possibility of increasing diversity without 
causing any disruption of existing service.") with id. at 800-801 ("In the instant case, far from 
seeking to limit the flow of information, the Commission has acted, in the Court of Appeals' words, 
"to enhance the diversity of information heard by the public without on-going government 
surveillance of the content of speech.") 
65. [d. at 796-97 (citing National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938, 
961 (D.C. Cir 1977». 
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diversity. It firmly stated that limiting media ownership is, in itself, a First 
Amendment principle.66 Further, it established a standard of considerable 
deference to the FCC, naming media diversity an "elusive" goal for which 
judicial second guessing is inappropriate.67 Not surprisingly, the FCC liked the 
descriptor "elusive" as applied to media diversity, for the adjective dubbed it a 
sort of Delphic expert agency-whose often cryptic pronouncements should be 
accepted even by robed mortals. Citation to the "elusive" language in NCCB is 
found in virtually all subsequent FCC decisions concerning ownership and media 
diversity.68 
B. Diversity, Scarcity, and Changing Standards: The Supreme Court and the 
Courts of Appeal 
In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC (Turner l)69 and Turner 
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC (Turner Il),7o the Court ruled on the 
constitutionality of a statute that required cable systems to carry local 
broadcasters' signals (the "must-carry" statutes). These cases certainly represent 
a shift from the view that all media regulation is governed by the rational basis 
standard of NCCB.71 In these opinions, the Court established the principle that 
only regulation of broadcast, due to its unique history and the scarcity doctrine, 
should receive such lax review. Instead, cable regulation, and presumably other, 
non-broadcast media regulation, should receive intermediate scrutiny as a 
content-neutral restriction on speech.72 Given these decisions' fractured 
pluralities, the future of media regulation is in doubt. In addition, lower courts, 
in cases like Time Warner,73 Sinclair/4 and Schurz75 point to the difficulties the 
FCC may face in the future in getting its regulations upheld. In short, these 
courts, under the rubric of intermediate scrutiny, demand more precise 
measurements and a clearer definition of diversity. 
66. National Citizens Committee/or Broadcasting, 436 U.S. at 790. 
67. See National Citizens Committee/or Broadcasting, 436 U.S. at 796-97. 
68. See Biennial Media Ownership Order, 18 F.C.C.R. 13,620, para. 432 (July 02, 2003); 
1998 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of Commission's Broadcast Ownership Rules, 15 
F.C.C.R. 11,058, para. 81 (Jun 20, 2000); Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing 
Television Broadcasting Television Satellite Stations Review of Policy And Rules, 14 F.C.C.R. 
12,903, n. 49 (Aug 06, 1999); Matter of Evaluation of the Syndication and Financial Interest Rules, 
6 F.C.C.R. 3094 (May 29, 1991) (Separate Statement of Commissioner James H. Quello, 
dissenting to the overall result, and concurring in part); In the Matter of Amendment of Sections 
73.35, 73.240, and 73.636 of the Commission's Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, PM 
and Television Broadcast Stations., 95 F.C.C.2d 360 (Oct 20, 1983). 
69. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (Turner I). 
70. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC. 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (Turner II). 
71. See generally FCC v. Nat'l Citizen's Comm'n for Broad., 436 U.S. 775 (1978). 
72. Turner!, 512 U.S. at 662. 
73. Time Warner Entm't Co. v. United States, 211 F.3d 1313 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
74. Sinclair Broad. Group v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 155 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
75. Schurz Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043 (7th Cir. 1992). 
HeinOnline -- 33 N. Ky. L. Rev. 383 2006
2006] CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND REGULATORY CHALLENGES 383 
Many observers (and justices) claimed that the must-carry statutes at issue in 
Turner I and Turner II resulted from broadcasters' fear that over-the-air 
broadcast television would become obsolete in an age when virtually every 
household receives its signals through a cable. And, given that the local 
broadcasters are among the few media outlets that cover the doings of the local 
representative or senator, Congress is without doubt solicitous towards 
broadcasters' needs and responsive to their fears-and thus designed the must-
carry law to help broadcasters.76 Regardless of the political motivations that 
gave rise to the must-carry provisions, requiring cable systems to carry particular 
programming implicates the First Amendment because it mandates certain 
speech and restricts the opportunity to air other types of programming. It is on 
that basis that they were primarily challenged.77 
In Turner I, the Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of the must-
carry regulation, specifically sections 4 and 5 of the Cable Television Consumer 
Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (1992 Cable Act or Act). Section 4 
requires carriage of "local commercial television stations," which is defined to 
include all full power television broadcasters that operate within the same 
television market as the cable system.78 According to their size, cable systems 
must reserve a portion of their available capacity to carry local broadcasts.79 
Section 5 of the Act imposes similar carriage requirements regarding local public 
broadcast television stations. 80 
Specifically, in Turner I, the Supreme Court reviewed sections 4 and 5 of the 
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (1992 
Cable Act or Act). Section 4 requires carriage of "local commercial television 
stations," defined to include all full power television broadcasters, that operate 
within the same television market as the cable system.81 • According to their size, 
cable systems must reserve a portion of their available capacity to carry local 
broadcast.82 Section 5 of the Act imposes similar carriage requirements 
regarding local public broadcast television stations.83 
76. Id .. at 676 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I cannot avoid the 
conclusion that [the statutory] preference for broadcasters over cable programmers is justified with 
reference to content."); see also id. at 685 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
("Congress' 'must-carry" regime ... reflects an unwarranted content-based preference .... "); see 
also Ashutosh Bhagwat, Of Markets and Media: The First Amendment, the New Mass Media, and 
the Political Components of Culture, 74 N.C. L. REv. 141, 186 (1995) ("A preference for local 
broadcasting and community-based speakers [as expressed in the must-carry rules] incorporates, at 
least to some degree, a vision of the appropriate structure of society that is political at heart, and 
therefore suspect."). 
77. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Coun, 1996 Term--Foreword: Implementing the 
Constitution, III HARv. L. REv. 56, 118-122 (1997). 
78. Cable Act of 1992 § 4,47 U.S.C. §§ 534(b)(l)(B), (h)(I)(A) (2000). 
79. 47 U.S.c. § 534(b)(1) (2000). 
80. 47 U.S.C. § 535(a) (2000). 
81. Cable Act of 1992, § 4,47 U.S.c. §§ 534(b)(l)(B), (h)(l)(A) (1988 ed., Supp. IV) 
82. 47 U.S.C. § 534(b)(l). 
83. 47 U.S.C. § 535(a). 
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The Court in Turner I did not apply the rational basis review that the NCCB 
court applied to the broadcast-newspaper cross-ownership distinction and that is 
applicable to economic regulation in general. That standard was not appropriate, 
the Court reasoned because, "cable television does not suffer from the inherent 
limitations that characterize the broadcast medium .... Nor is there any danger 
of physical interference between two cable speakers attempting to share the same 
channel.,,84 Rather it limited its deferential First Amendment review of media 
ownership solely to the broadcast context, and ruled that intermediate scrutiny, 
appropriate for content-neutral regulations of speech, should be applied to cable 
regulation.85 
In reaching this conclusion,the Court reasoned that the rules "on their face" 
were content-neutral because they "impose obligations upon all operators, save 
those with fewer than 300 subscribers, regardless of the programs or stations 
they now offer or have offered in the past.,,86 Further, the Court determined the 
Congress did not intend to favor one type of speech over another, for "our 
review of the Act and its various findings persuades us that Congress' overriding 
objective in enacting must-carry was not to favor programming of a particular 
subject matter, viewpoint, or format, but rather to preserve access to free 
television programming for the 40 percent of Americans without cable.,,87 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned that the rules "on their face," 
were content-neutral because they "impose obligations upon all operators, save 
those with fewer than 300 subscribers, regardless of the programs or stations 
they now offer or have offered in the past.88 Further, the Court determined that 
Congress did not intend to favor one type of speech over another through a 
facially neutral statute, stating that "our review of the Act and its various 
findings persuades us that Congress' overriding objective in enacting must-carry 
was not to favor programming of a particular subject matter, viewpoint, or 
format, but rather to preserve access to free television programming for the 40 
percent of Americans without cable. ,,89 
The Court concluded that the must-carry rules receive intermediate scrutiny, 
applicable to content- neutral restrictions that impose an incidental burden on 
speech.90 Under this test, the Court'sustains a content-neutral regulation if it 
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental 
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental 
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to 
the furtherance of that interest. 91 
84. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 638-39. 
85. Id. at 662. 
86. Id. at 644. 
87. Id. at 646. 
88. Id. at 644; see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989). 
89. Id. at 646. 
90. Id. at 663. 
91. Id. at 664. 
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The Court reasoned that the governmental interest in the must-carry statute 
was sufficient "in the abstract" to withstand intermediate scrutiny.92 A four-
Justice plurality found that genuine issues of material fact remained concerning 
whether "the economic health of local broadcasting is in genuine jeopardy and in 
need of the protections afforded by must-carry,,,93 and whether must-carry 
'''burden[s] substantially more speech than is necessary to further the 
government's legitimate interests.,,94 To secure a majority of the Court, Justice 
Stevens, who would have ruled the statute constitutional on the record then 
before the Court, agreed with the plurality to remand the case to the district court 
for further proceedings.95 
When the remand returned to the Supreme Court in Turner II, the Court 
affirmed the must carry statute, again by a fractured majority. The four-member 
plurality opinion ruled that Congress reasonably concluded that cable television 
posed an economic threat to the viability of broadcast stations and that Congress 
could legitimately encourage "diversity in broadcast television service" as a 
policy goal.,,96 Justice Breyer, in concurrence, relied more on the diversity 
rationale, than on economics or antitrust, concluding, and echoing NCCB, that it 
"has long been a basic tenet of national communications policy . . . that the 
widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic 
sources is essential to the welfare of the public.,,97 
The dissenting justices argued the majority failed to identify true 
anticompetitive harms that the must carry statute remedied-faulting the 
plurality and concurrence for citing examples of carriage decision adverse to 
broadcast, but not examining whether these decisions had appreciable impacts on 
any particular markets or on viewership rates.98 Further, "when separated from 
anticompetitive conduct," the interest in simply preserving a "multiplicity of 
broadcast programming sources" for its own sake becomes an untenable policy 
goal.,,99 The dissent stated "[n]either the principal opinion nor the partial 
concurrence offers any guidance on what might constitute a 'significant 
reduction' in the availability of broadcast programming."IOO 
The "Lochnerism" of Turner I and Turner II reflects the Court's demand (or, 
at least, a significant portion of the Court) for clearer definitions and better 
evidence from the FCC. While NCCB was more than happy to declare diversity 
"elusive" and accept pretty much any FCC action that created more "voices," the 
92. [d. at 663. 
93. [d. at 665. 
94. [d. (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799). 
95. [d. at 673-674 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
96. Turner II, 520 U.S. at 204. 
97. [d. at 226-27 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 
U.S. 649, 668 n.27 (1972)); see also FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582 (1981). 
98. [d. at 229-30 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
99. [d. at 232 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
100. [d. 
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dissent in Turner II demanded a clear definition of media diversity and metrics 
to measure it. While the Turner cases established as law a higher standard of 
First Amendment review, they-particularly the dissent in Turner II-also point 
to a more rigorous approach to establishing factual claims about diversity. 
Several lower courts presaging and following· Turner also have required rigorous 
factual showings-pointing to the same weakness in the FCC's rulemaking. 
In Schurz Communications, Inc. v. FCC,101 the Seventh Circuit, in an opinion 
authored by Richard Posner, reviewed the FCC's financial interest and 
syndication or "FINCEN" rules that prohibited a television network from 
licensing its own programs for rebroadcast by independent stations or from 
purchasing syndication rights from independent producers.102 The regulations 
required the networks to sell syndication rights to an independent syndicator. \03 
These regulations were revised and re-promulgated in 1991.104 
The justification for these rules was the fear that the networks would 
leverage their control of programming distribution into a control of programming 
production, refusing to purchase non-affiliated programming unless the 
producers surrendered syndication rights and charging too much for syndication 
to independent, non-affiliated stations. \05 As Judge Posner explained, "the rules 
would strengthen the independent stations (and so derivatively the outside 
producers, for whom the independent stations were an important market along 
with the networks themselves) by securing them against having to purchase 
reruns from their competitors the networks."I06 
This case was decided well before the Turner cases and, therefore, rational 
basis scrutiny applied-a conclusion Posner accepted but reluctantly so. 107 
Perhaps not surprisingly, Judge Posner therefore took a highly skeptical look at 
the rule's purported goals and stated means. Anticipating later post-Turner 
101. Schurz Cornmc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043 (7th Cir. 1992). 
102. [d. at 1045. 
103. [d. The court distinguished between licensing of programming, which would entail 
ongoing revenues for the network, and were thus prohibited under the regulations, and outright sale 
of programming, which would not give the network an interest in later revenues, which was 
pennitted. [d. 
104. Evaluation of the Syndication and Financial Interest Rules, 56 Fed. Reg. 26242 (May 29, 
1991), reconsidered and affirmed by 56 Fed. Reg. 64207 (Dec. 9, 1991) (amending 47 C.F.R §§ 
73.658-73.622, 73.3526). 
105. Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1045. Judge Posner indicated in the opinion that: 
The concern behind the rules was that the networks, controlling as they did 
through their owned and operated stations and their affiliates a large part of the 
system for distributing television programs to American households, would 
unless restrained use this control to seize a dominating position in the 
production of television programs. That is, they would lever their distribution 
"monopoly" into a production "monopoly." 
106. Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1046. 
107. [d. at 1049 ("And although as an original matter one might doubt that the First Amendment 
authorized the government to regulate so important a part of the marketplace in ideas and opinions 
as television broadcasting, the Supreme Court has consistently taken a different view"). 
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cases, he questioned the justification for the rules, arguing that, in fact, the rules 
might weaken independent producers by limiting their bargaining power. 108 He 
also questioned the justification that diversity in programming was increased by 
strengthening independent programming. I09 He pointed out, trotting out the 
famous HotellinglSteinerl1O economic argument quoted in the Introduction, that 
more concentrated markets produce greater diversity. 
In light of this theoretical possibility-i.e., that monopolistic market 
structure produces more diversity-and the development of multi-channel cable 
television, III Posner challenged the FCC's claim that restrictions on network 
participation in programming promote diversity.ll2 Posner points out that the 
term diversity "is never defined"l\3 in the FCC's order and, therefore, one cannot 
see how the agency can claim that its restrictions further diversity, particularly in 
light of the economic theory that would predict that fewer ownership limits 
would enhance diversity. I 14 
In Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC/IS the D.C. Circuit reviewed the 
FCC's national caps of cable ownership. I 16 Section 11 (c) of the Cable 
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, \17 (" 1992 Cable 
Act"), requires the Federal Communications Commission to set (i) "limits on the 
number of cable subscribers a person is authorized to reach through cable 
systems owned by such person, or in which such person has an attributable 
interest" (the "horizontal limit") 118 and (ii) "limits on the number of channels on 
a cable system that can be occupied by a video programmer in which a cable 
operator has an attributable interest." (the "vertical limit,,).119 Pursuant to the 
statute, the FCC imposes a 30% "horizontal" limit on the number of subscribers 
that may be served by a multiple cable system operator and required cable 
108. [d. at 1051 (noting that "[t]he new rules ... appear to harm rather than help ... by 
reducing their bargaining options. It is difficult to see how taking away a part of a seller's market 
could help the seller."). 
109. [d. at 1054. 
110. The Hotelling and Steiner models both address, from varying vantage points, the effect that 
market concentration has on variety of available choices. For a more detailed discussion of both 
models, consider Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39 EcON. J. 41 (1929), and Peter O. 
Steiner, Program Patterns and Preferences, and the Workability of Competition in Radio 
Broadcasting, 66 Q.J. EcON. 194 (1952). 
111. [d. at 1055 ("Almost everyone in this country now has or soon will have cable television 
with 50 or 100 or even 200 different channels to choose among."). 
112. [d. 
113. [d. at 1054. 
114. [d.; see also supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
115. Time Warner Entm't Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, Consumer 
Fed'n of Am. v. FCC, 534 U.S. 1054 (2001). 
116. Time Warner, 240 F.3d at 1028-30. 
117. Cable Television Consumer Protection & Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 
106 Stat. 1460 (1992) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 533). 
118. 47 U.S.C. § 533(f)(1)(A). 
119. 47 U.S.C. § 533(f)(I)(B). 
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systems to reserve 60% of their channel capacity for programming by non-
affiliated fIrms. 120 
The cable companies, Time Warner and AT&T, challenged the horizontal as 
exceeding statutory authority, unconstitutional infringements of their freedom of 
speech, and products of arbitrary and capricious decision-making in violation the 
Administrative Procedure ACt. 121 Time Warner similarly challenged the vertical 
limit. 122 The Commission supported its horizontal limit on the grounds that it 
"maximizes" the number of cable systems so that "[ w ]ith more MSOs 
[multivideo system operators, i.e., cable companies] making purchasing 
decisions, this increases the likelihood that the MSOs will make different 
programming choices and a greater variety of media voices will therefore be 
available to the public.,,123 
The court rejected this justification, finding, inter alia, the FCC's 
understanding of diversity as too flimsy.124 Finding the FCC's understanding of 
diversity as too flimsy, the court explained: 
[w]e have some concern how far such a theory [of diversity] may be 
pressed against First Amendment norms. Everything else being equal, 
each additional "voice" may be said to enhance diversity. And in this 
special context, every additional splintering of the cable industry 
increases the number of combinations of companies whose acceptance 
would in the aggregate lay the foundations for a programmer's viability. 
But at some point, surely, the marginal value of such an increment in 
"diversity" would not qualify as an "important" governmental interest. 
Is moving from 100 possible combinations to 101 "important"? It is not 
clear to us how a court could determine the point where gaining such an 
. . I· 125 Increment IS no onger Important. 
While the court sidestepped this issue of how much value the marginal voice has 
when weighed against "First Amendment norms," it did rule that under the Cable 
Act amendments, diversity means only that a programmer is guaranteed two 
possible outlets. 126 The court remanded to the FCC on the grounds that 
ownership caps could be justified, inter alia, on the excess bargaining power 
they gave cable operators. 127 
The 1996 Telecommunications Act instructed the Commission to conduct a 
rulemaking proceeding, "to determine whether to retain, modify, or eliminate its 
120. Time Warner, 240 F.3d at 1129. 
121. Id. at 1128. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 1134 (citing In the Matter of Implementation of Section lI(C) of the Cable 
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 14 F.C.C.R. 19098, 19119'11 54 
(Oct. 20, 1999)) (parenthetical text added). 
124. See Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1135 (2001). 
125. Id. (emphasis in original). 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 1144-45. 
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limitation on the number of television stations that a person may own in ... the 
same television market." 128 Pursuant to the Act, the Commission promulgated 
the Local Ownership Order, which relaxed its prohibition on one entity 
controlling more than one station in a particular Nielsen designated market area 
(DMA) under certain conditions, one being the existence of eight independently 
owned full-power television stations.129 In counting this eight voice exception, 
the Commission determined that only broadcast television should count because, 
"there remain unresolved questions about the extent to which [non-broadcast 
television] alternatives are widely accessible and provide meaningful substitutes 
to broad[cast] stations.,,130 The Commission adopted a different counting 
approach in its exception to the radio-television cross-ownership rule in which it 
does count local newspapers and cable television stations. \31 Sinclair 
Broadcasting challenged the rule on the grounds that eight was an arbitrary 
number of voices and that there was no reason to exclude non-broadcast 
voices. \32 
The D.C. Circuit, while reciting the language of deference in NCCB, 
remanded on the ground that the Commission irrationally excluded cable from its 
eight-voice count. \33 While the Commission stated that broadcast was more 
important than cable, it never presented a theory or any data as to why broadcast, 
but not cable, should constitute a "voice.,,134 Of course, this should not surprise. 
If an agency cannot define "diversity," then it can have no idea about what might 
constitute one "unit" of diversity. 135 
Judge Sentelle, who dissented in part on the grounds that the diversity rules 
should be vacated, not simply remanded, attacked the Commission for claiming 
that eight voices ensures an appropriate level of diversity but then failing to 
provide evidence that its rules will re~ult in diversity.136 While agreeing that an 
agency has broad discretion to draw lines, Sentelle points out that "there are no 
meaningful limits to the diversity rationale offered [and] ... [t]here is no 
suggestion as to how much diversity is enough, how much it too little, or how 
much is too much.,,137 
Schurz, Time Warner, and Sinclair as well as the dissent in Turner II, 
expressed the same frustration:· how can a court determine whether the FCC's 
rules reasonably further diversity, when the FCC, itself, cannot precisely define 
128. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub L. No. 104-104, §202(c)(2) (codified at 47 U.S.C. 
§303(c)(2». 
129. Broad. Group v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 155 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
130. [d. 
131. [d. 
132. [d. at 158-59. 
133. [d. at 169. 
134. Sinclair Broad. Group, 284 F.3d at 163. 
135. [d. at 164-65. 
136. [d. at 169-172. 
137. [d. at 170. 
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the term?138 On one hand, this does not represent "Lochnerism"-an ideological 
use of constitutional principles to overturn statutes or regulations. It perhaps 
instead, or also, represents a growing sophistication among the judiciary in 
economic matters and judicial confidence to rely on economic principles in 
questioning administrative agencies. 139 This demand for a higher level of 
justification could reflect frustration at the FCC's often transparently political 
accommodations-appellate courts have simply no trust that behind the 
"elusive" concept of diversity there is nothing but Beltway interest-adjustments. 
On the other hand, these cases do represent a sort of Lochnerism in that 
courts are demanding a much higher level of proof and justification than did the 
NCCB court and appear to be expressing an ideological aversion to the FCC's 
ownership regulation. l40 Arguably, the 4-justice dissent in Turner I, calling for 
the highest level of First Amendment scrutiny on must-carry, reflects an 
ideological aversion to media regulation, as much as it does a reasoned 
application of the notoriously vague content-basedlcontent-neutral distinction. 141 
Indeed, as some have pointed out, this higher level of scrutiny may simply 
represent an indifference to the normative questions media ownership 
presents. 142 
In any case, against this legal background, the FCC, under the leadership of 
Chairman Michael Powell, undertook a massive, comprehensive re-examination 
of virtually all of the media ownership rules concerning broadcast in 2003: the 
Biennial Media Ownership Order. As discussed below, the FCC's continued 
failure to forward a meaningful definition of diversity doomed the Order's fate 
on appeal to the Third Circuit in Prometheus Radio. It is to this Order and its 
appellate review that the next section turns. 
n. THE FCC's BIENNIAL MEDIA OWNERSHIP ORDER AND ITS APPELLATE 
REVIEW 
On July 2, 2003, the FCC released its Biennial Media Order which re-
examined the entire spectrum (so to speak) of broadcast ownership regulation. 143 
The Order examined the most important media ownership rules including: the 
138. See Schurz Commune's. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043 (1992); Time Warner Entertainment Co. 
v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126 (2001); Sinclair Broad. Group v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148 (D.C. Cir. 2002); 
Turner Broad. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997). 
139. See Schurz Commune's. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043 (1992); Time Warner Entertainment Co. 
v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126 (2001); Sinclair Broad. Group v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148 (D.C. Cir. 2002); 
Turner Broad. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997). 
140. See Schurz Commune's. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043 (1992); Time Warner Entertainment Co. 
v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126 (2001); Sinclair Broad. Group v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148 (D.C. Cir. 2002); 
Turner Broad. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997). 
141. Turner Broad. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997). 
142. C. Edwin Baker, Turner Broadcasting: Content-Based Regulation of Persons and 
Presses, 1994 Sup. Ct. Rev. 57, 80-128 (1994). 
143. Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 386 (3d Cir. 2004). 
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cross ownership rules that prohibited television station ownership from owning 
newspapers or radio stations within the same market; the local television cap that 
limited the number of stations one firm could own in a particular market, and the 
local radio cap that limits ownership concentration in local radio markets. l44 In 
general, the FCC justified the Biennial Media Ownership Order on the basis that 
the FCC had long established that its restrictions further the policy goals of 
"competition, localism, and diversity," particularly in news coverage. 145 
("Localism" is defined as the goal of local news outlets to be responsive to the 
needs of the local community and is a type of diversity that the FCC particularly 
encourages-though arguably this diversity occurs at the expense of other types 
of media diversity.)I46 
In the Biennial Media Ownership Order, the FCC attempted to put forth a 
more subtle and complex notion of diversity, combining diversity of ownership 
with market share.147 Yet, the FCC continued to rely squarely on the assumption 
that diversity of outlet ownership implies diversity of viewpoint. 148 It never 
effectively utilized research that attempted to identify and quantify actual 
diversity of ideas. The court in Prometheus Radio had little trouble rejecting the 
FCC's reasoning. 149 
A. The Two Cross-Ownership Rules. 
In the Biennial Media Ownership Order, the FCC abolished both the radio-
television and television-newspaper cross ownership rules. 150 In their stead, the 
FCC created a complicated scheme in which different standards apply to 
different markets. 151 In effect, the FCC eliminated all cross-ownership 
restrictions in large media markets. 152 In the smallest media markets, it retained 
limits. 153 For those markets in between, it created the "Diversity Index" (01) to 
determine whether markets were "at risk" for a lack of media diversity.154 If a 
market has too low of a 01, such market would potentially be subject to further 
regulation. 155 
The 01 was modeled after the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHO in antitrust 
law, which measures the degree of concentration in markets for antitrust 
144. [d. at 386-89. 
145. [d. at 446. 
146. [d. at 447. 
147. [d. 
148. [d. 
149. [d. at 382. 
150. 373 F.3d at 387-88. 
151. [d. at 388. 
152. [d. 
153. [d. 
154. [d. 
155. 373 F.3d at 403-04. 
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purposes. 156 The higher the HHI, the more concentrated the market, and the 
more potential there is for market participants to exercise market power.157 The 
HHI is a simple calculation that squares each market participant's share. 158 
Analogously (in a rough way), the DI measures "viewpoint diversity" 
concentration. It weights various media (newspapers, radio, etc.) by their market 
share in the total media market. 159 But then, the DI does not weigh the market 
share of each flrm.l60 Rather, within a given media category (newspaper, 
television, etc.), each outlet counts equally, regardless of its market share. 161 
The DI, however, only really counts the number of participants in a market, 
not the diversity and dissemination of views. 162 Thus, while HHI is tied to 
market performance in some general way, it is not clear what the DI measures. It 
does not measure diversity; it measures market share and the number of market 
participants. 163 Thus, a market with 50 independent radio stations all saying the 
same thing would rank higher in the DI than an NPR and FoxNews duopoly.l64 
Obviously, this is a limited metric. 
The Prometheus Radio court rejected the DI-and the FCC's elimination of 
the cross-ownership rules-largely because it failed to coherently count heads in 
order to provide meaningful estimate of media diversity.165 Thus, as the court 
observed, "the Dutchess Community College television and the stations owned 
by ABC" receive equal weighting. l66 The Court also rejected the Commission's 
inclusion of internet news, but exclusion of cable news in its diversity 
calculation.167 Again, the FCC was on shaky grounds because it attempted to 
pick and chose which outlets to "count" rather than observe consumer behavior 
and the nature of news coverage, i.e., measure real media diversity. 
B. Local Television Cap. 
The FCC's order relaxed the local television cap, permitting a single flrm to 
. own two or three television stations in certain markets. 168 Speciflcally, the order 
permitted triopolies in markets of 18 stations or more and duopolies in markets 
156. [d. 
157. [d. 
158. [d. 
159. [d. at 403. 
160. 373 F.3d at 404. 
161. [d. 
162. [d. 
163. [d. 
164. See id. 
165. 373 F.3d at 409. 
166. [d. at 408. 
167. [d. at 408-09. 
168. Biennial Media Ownership Order, en 134. 
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of 17 or fewer. 169 The FCC continued to prohibit common ownership among the 
top four stations in any given market. 170 
This cap, therefore, treated ownership of the fifth, sixth, and seventh most-
watched station equivalent to that of the 16th, 17th, and 18th•171 This was designed 
to ensure that most markets would have six firms because six equal-sized firms 
would create an HHI index below 1800-and, therefore, was assumed to present 
no competitive problems.172 
The FCC simply presumed that the firms would be equal-sized-and the 
court had no problem finding this assumption irrational saying, "No evidence 
supports the Commission's equal market share assumption, and no reasonable 
explanation underlies its decision to disregard actual market share.,,173 
C. Local Radio Cap. 
Existing regulation had a complicated tiered system of local radio ownership 
limits. In radio markets with 45 or more radio stations, a company could own up 
to eight stations, only five of which could be in one class, AM or FM.174 In 
markets with 30-44 radio stations, a company can own seven stations, only four 
of which could be in one class.175 In markets with 15-29 radio stations, a 
company can own six stations, only four of which may be in one class. In 
markets with 14 or fewer radio stations, a company can own five stations, only 
three of which could be in one class, and an owner cannot control more than 50 
percent of the stations within these markets. 176 
This rule was designed to guarantee five firms in all markets. 117 The 
Commission primarily relied on two articles in game theory, 15 and 30 years old 
respectively, for its claim that five equal-sized competitors would create a 
competitive market. 178 This was an odd justification, given that these articles 
were not specifically about local radio, and their application not immediately 
apparent. 
The court found the Commission's reliance on those articles irrational 
because the DOJ's merger guidelines and current policy contradict these articles' 
claims. 179 Further, the FCC inconsistently relied on the same DOJ Merger 
Guidelines in other parts of the order. 180 Finally, in a complaint that by now 
169. [d. See Prometheus Radio Project, 373 F.3d at 412. 
170. Prometheus Radio Project, 373 F.3d at 412. 
171. Biennial Media Ownership Order, '11134. 
172. Prometheus Radio Project, 373 F.3d 372, at 433-434. 
173. [d. 
174. Biennial Media Ownership Order, '11235. 
175. [d. at'll 236. 
176. [d. 
177. [d. 
178. Prometheus Radio Project, 373 F .3d 372, 433. 
179. [d. 
180. [d. 
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should sound tedious, the court also found illogical that the five voices, 
regardless of market share, contribute meaningfully to diversity.181 
m. COHERENT MEDIA OWNERSHIP IN TIMES OF GROWING JUDICIAL SKEPTICISM 
It is not clear whether the courts' growing demand for more convincing 
evidence and more precise notions of diversity stem from an ideology---or 
simply a growing awareness of the intellectual vapidity of the FCC's ownership 
rulemakings. On one hand, the four-justice dissent in Turner, calling for strict 
scrutiny of media ownership regulation, does seem to constitute an ideological 
opposition to the regulation-suggesting the existence of a "First Amendment 
Lochnerism.,,182 On the other hand, the majority in Prometheus Radio consisting 
of judges appointed by Democratic presidents-suggests that courts vacating the 
FCC's rulings are just sick of their inconsistencies and analytical short-
comings. 183 To the degree that First Amendment Lochnerism thwarts media 
ownership regulation, it has aimed its sights-as the preceding analysis 
suggests-at the FCC's inability to come up with a coherent approach to 
defining diversity. 
This section suggests that media ownership regulation can be strengthened in 
the face of a more disapproving judiciary in two ways. First, it can adopt a 
rigorous understanding of media diversity---one consistent with the more 
advanced economic and social scientific examinations of media markets. Of 
course, no approach to diversity-based media caps is a sure-fire-especially 
given the expertise that the large media companies can bring to oppose 
regulation in court. l84 Further, as a practical matter, the FCC-given the 
inevitable political compromises that characterize its decisions-probably could 
not bring itself to be bound by objective, scientific data. 
As an alternative approach, therefore, it can change the terms of the 
analysis-and use the vagaries of economic and social science to its advantage. 
As discussed above, the reviewing courts that have been so critical of the FCC's 
use of diversity have consistently asked how much diversity is enough or 
required by statute. 185 The FCC has not been able to answer that question 
because it can hardly even count diversity. What if the set of presumptions were 
changed? 
The FCC could establish as normative matter that widespread ownership is 
preferable-a position that this Article does not necessarily endorse, but many 
181. [d. 
182. See Turner, 512 U.S. at 673-74 (dissenting opinion). 
183. See Prometheus Radio Project, 373 F .3d at 372-480. 
184. See Time Waner Entm't Co., 240 F.3d 1126, 1136; Fox Television, 280 F.3d 1027, 144; 
Sinclair Broad. Group, 284 F.3d 148, 159; Promestheus Radio Project, 373 F.3d at 372-480. 
185. See Time Waner Entm't Co., 240 F.3d 1126, 1136; Fox Television, 280 F.3d 1027, 144; 
Sinclair Broad. Group, 284 F.3d 148, 159; Promestheus Radio Project, 373 F.3d at 372-480. 
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have defended convincingly as discussed below. 186 The question then becomes 
the familiar issue of how much is required. One could argue that the FCC should 
require as much diversity of ownership as possible until convincing evidence 
suggests that significant inefficiencies would be introduced into media markets. 
Of course, there can be argument about what constitutes "significant 
inefficiency" and how to measure it. On the other hand, this test is eminently 
superior to the "counting diversity" approach in that people can disagree about 
levels of inefficiency, but there is agreement on how to define efficiency-unlike 
diversity.187 Further, it provides a point at which policy can aim-rather than the 
current goal of "maximizing diversity" which is a goal without end.188 The 
following examines in greater detail these proposals. 
A. All That Elusive? Counting Diversity 
Many critics have called for "objective, quantifiable standards" rather than 
"hopelessly subjective criteria for enforcement" in the FCC's media ownership 
orders.189 Despite the language in NCCB that media diversity is "elusive," it can 
be measured. 190 Numerous economists and social scientists have done just 
that-looking to various media to see how many "ideas" or "viewpoints" are 
there contained.191 For instance, Berry & Waldfogel measure diversity in radio 
formats and relate formats to market structure.192 In order to determine what 
constitutes a separate format, they relied on Duncan, a service for radio 
advertisers. 193 It has 18 formats that it uses to categorize all radio stations 
nationwide. While not guaranteeing ontological certitude that there are 18 radio 
formats in Platonic heaven, Duncan does have an economic incentive to 
correctly identify different types of radio stations that attract different types of 
viewers. It is hardly a perfect measure, but it is defensible approach to counting 
186. See Generally C. Edwin Baker, Media Concentration: Giving up on Democracy, 54 FLA. 
L. REv. 839,909-11 (2002). 
187. See Generally Jim Chen, The Last Picture Show (Or the Twilight of Federal Mass 
Communications Regulation), 80 MINN. L. REv. 1415 (1996). 
188. Id. 
189. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. & A. Richard M. Blaiklock, Enhancing the Spectrum: Media 
Power, Democracy, and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2000 U. IIL. L. REv. 813, 869 - 70 (2000) 
(citing J. Gregory Sidak, Telecommunications in Jericho, 81 CAL. L. REv. 1209, 1230 (1993» 
(defending the use of diversity against Sidak's charge that only a "Pang1ossian" could believe that 
the FCC could arrive at a neutral definition of diversity). See generally Jim Chen, The Last Picture 
Show (On the Twilight of Federal Mass Communications Regulation), 80 MINN. L. REv. 1415 
(1996) 
190. See, Steven T. Berry & Joel Waldfogel, Do Mergers Increase Product Variety? Evidence 
from Radio Broadcasting, 116(3) Q. J. ECON. 1009-25 (August 2001). 
191. Id. 
192. Id. at 1009. 
193. While not guaranteeing ontological certitude that there are only a limited number of radio 
formats in Platonic heaven, Duncan does have an economic incentive to correctly identify different 
types of radio stations that attract different types of viewers. 
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diversity in media. 194 Peter Alexander has examined the harmonic complexity 
and diversity of music played on broadcast radio and related that complexity and 
diversity to certain market structures. 195 
More indirect measures of diversity in media, particularly as it affects the 
robustness of political participation, include examining the relationship between 
rates of participation by eligible voters in local elections and media market 
structure. 196 For instance, George and Waldfogel, Oberholzer-Gee and 
Waldfogel, and Scheufele show the structure of local media markets affects the 
nature of political participation. 197 
Even if "counting" diversity in this fashion has intellectual rigor, it may be 
appropriate in an academic setting, not the politicized FCC. 198 Indeed, the 
FCC's unwillingness to rely upon such approaches may stem from the limits they 
place on FCC discretion. l99 Further, social science can rarely provide the 
irrefutability that mathematics and physics do.2OO Studies which attempt to 
classify media by their content would inevitably involve methodological 
challenges.20I A court with a penchant towards "First Amendment Lochnerism" 
could probably find sufficient incompleteness or uncertainty in any set of studies 
to overturn any FCC order that relied upon them. 202 
194. Berry and Waldfogel's approach has been criticized. See, George Williams, Keith Brown, 
& Peter Alexander, Radio Market Structure and Music Diversity, Federal Communications 
Commission Media Bureau Staff Research Paper, 4 (September 2002), at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_publiclattachmatch/DOCS-226838AI8.pdf. (last" visited April 11, 
2006); See also, Gregory M. Prindle, Note, No Competition: How Radio Consolidation Has 
Diminished Diversity and Sacrificed Localism, 14 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. LJ. 279, 
314 (Autumn 2003). 
195. Peter J. Alexander, Entropy and Popular Culture: Product Diversity in the Popular Music 
Recording Industry, 61 AM. Soc. R. 171 (1996). 
196. See, Lisa George & Joel Waldfogel, Does the New York Times Spread Ignorance and 
Apathy? Working Paper, (July 5, 2002) at 
http://rider.wharton.upenn.edul-waldfogjlNYT_ignorance_2002.pdf (last visited April 11, 2006); 
Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Joel Waldfogel, Electoral Acceleration: The Effect of Minority Population 
on Minority Voter Turnout, (2001) NBER Working Paper No. 8252. NBER Website,. at 
http://papers.nber.orglpapers/W8252. (last visited April 11, 2006); Dietram A. Scheufele, 
Examining Differential Gains from Mass Media and Their Implications for Participatory 
Behavior, 29(1) Comm. Res. 46-65. (February 2002). 
197. Id. 
198. See generally, Kristen Morse, Relaxing the Rules of Media Ownership: Localism and 
Competition and Diversity, Oh My! The Frightening Road of Deregulation, 24 J. Nat'l A. Admin. 
L. Judges 351, 370-75, (Fall 2004) (discussing the political reaction to the Biennial Media 
Ownership Order including the 3 to 2 vote along party lines and the minority commissioners' and 
Congressional reactions.). 
199. FCC v. Nat'l Citizizens Comm. For Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978). 
200. See, e.g., Milton Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics 5 (The University of Chicago 
Press) (1953) (noting the "special difficulties in achieving objectivity" in contrasting social science 
with the physical sciences). 
201. See e.g., Prometheus Radio, 373 F.3d at 418-20. 
202. Id. 
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B. Changing Presumptions: Stop Counting Diversity 
Following the W.H. Auden injunction "Thou shalt not sitlWith statisticians 
nor commit! A social science,,,203 one could re-conceptualize the FCC diversity 
inquiry in a way that limits significantly the reliance on economic data and 
changes the showings that challengers to FCC regulation must make. The FCC's 
current approach puts it in a position of declaring when there is "enough" 
diversity and defining what diversity is?04 It may be impossible for an agency to 
do this, particularly in times of a more skeptical judiciary. A different approach 
might abandon the pretense of counting diverse viewpoints and state simply that 
the FCC aims to further diversity of ownership--a position probably not 
incongruent with Supreme Court precedent.205 
C. Six Values that Decentralized Ownership 
Edwin Baker identifies six values that decentralized ownership furthers?06 
First, Baker argues: 
[O]wners living in the community where the media product is 
distributed and owners closer to journalistic/editorial process are 
generally likely to exercise more desirable decisionmaking control and 
to be relatively more concerned with quality and less single-mindedly 
focused on profit. Their identity is likely more at stake in relation to the 
quality of the product, an effect reinforced by being personally close to 
the consumers and professionally close to the journalism critics who 
evaluate them primarily on the basis of content quality and not merely 
the firm's economic success.207 
Second, Baker identifies the "Berlusconi impropriety" of one media interest, 
allied with a political interest, exercising an excessive control over a 
democracy's civil discourse.208 Third, decentralized ownership, Baker argues, 
performs a watchdog or checking function--correcting the errors and mistake of 
anyone source of information.209 Fourth, decentralized ownership prevents 
control of the media by corporate interests outside of media-interests that may 
203. W.H. Auden, Under Which Lyre (1946) reprinted in COlLECfED POEMS, 335, 339 (Edward 
Mendelson, ed., 1991). 
204. See supra notes 116, 128 and accompanying text. 
205. Regulations limiting media ownership without regard to viewpoint would be content-
neutral and thus subject to intermediate scrutiny. See Turner 1,512 U.S. at 643-44,652. A strong 
argument can be made that such regulations would further the important government interest of 
promoting diversity of ownership. The reasons that diversity of ownership could qualify as an 
important government interest are explored in the text that follows. See infra notes 200-208 and 
accompanying text. 
206. C. Edwin Baker, Media Concentration: Giving Up on Democracy, 54 FLA. L. REv. 839, 
902-13 (2002). 
207. [d. at 904. 
208. [d. at 905-06. 
209. Id. at 906-07. 
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skew reporting.21O For instance, Baker points to Dupont's threat of withdrawal of 
advertising that apparently prompted Time, Inc., to pressure its associated 
Fortune book club to drop the distribution of a book critical of Dupont. 2 I I Baker 
also contends that concentrated ownership can lend itself to co-option by one 
particular approach to the news, such as Rupert Murdoch's, and that 
concentrated media structures can create unwelcome synergies with other 
corporate interests.2t2 
Starting from the normative position that decentralization of ownership is 
desirable for its own sake, the FCC could then examine particular media markets 
with an eye to maximize decentralization of ownership up to the point at which 
significant economic inefficiencies can be expected. This approach would be 
immune from the problems that have plagued FCC media ownership regulation 
as of late-how much diversity is needed.213 Explicitly accepting diversity of 
ownership as a goal provides an answer. 
While determining when inefficiencies would emerge in markets may be 
difficult, it is an inquiry with an agreed-upon criterion: economic efficiency-as 
opposed to the diversity determination that courts have found without criterion. 
Agencies, in general, receive considerable deference when engaged in line-
drawing.214 
This approach alters the de facto burden of proof. Under its current 
approach to diversity regulation, the FCC must (i) create a metric for diversity 
and then (ii) determine whether its limits provide for "enough" diversity.215 Both 
steps are conceptually and theoretically tenuous. Under the approach proposed 
here, the FCC could propose a limit reasonably based upon the evidence in the 
record-and those who would appeal the order would have to show that 
efficiency mandated a different limit.216 The FCC would only have to show that 
it would be reasonable to expect that its limits would not create grave efficiency 
losses given the evidence; its opponents would have to show that efficiency 
losses/gains would be greater or lesser at some other level of concentration.2t7 
This argument would be based upon a concept, economic efficiency, about 
210. Id. at 908. 
211. Id. 
212. Id. at 909. 
213. See supra Part II. 
214. See Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 159 (D.C.Cir.2002) ("Where issues 
involve elusive and not easily defined areas ... , our review is considerably more deferential, 
according broad leeway to the [agency's] line-drawing determinations." (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted». 
215. See Prometheus Radio, 373 F.3d at 402-03. 
216. See id. at 409 ([T]he Commission needs to undergird its predictive judgment ... with 
some evidence for that judgment to survive arbitrary and capricious review."). If there is sufficient 
evidence in the record to support the agency action and survive arbitrary and capricious review, the 
burden shifts to the challenger to convince the court that the agency decision should not stand. See 
id. 
217. See sources cited supra notes 52 and 64. 
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which there can be reasoned analysis. Given the defense to agency line drawing, 
the FCC's opponents would have to make the positive, affirmative case that a 
particular limit was arbitrary and capricious given the economic data, a difficult 
job given vagaries of economic theory and data. Rather than relying on 
conclusions about diversity, the FCC's limit would rely on a normative 
presumption that decentralized ownership is the preferable default rule. It could 
then look to economic efficiency as a principle to limit the application of that 
rule. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The future of media ownership regulation in the United States is in flux. 
The FCC has yet to revise the limits the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit remanded. In the face of increasingly skeptical courts, media 
regulation will depend in no small measure on the intellectual rigor of the FCC's 
analyses. To the degree "First Amendment Lochnerism" controls courts' 
behavior, the FCC must do a better job at justifying its regulations. Given the 
readiness with which courts have struck down its determinations about media 
diversity, the FCC must re-examine its entire approach to media diversity. This 
article has suggested several new approaches for a fresh regulatory start. 
HeinOnline -- 33 N. Ky. L. Rev. 400 2006
